Domain health guide
How SPF, DKIM, and DMARC work together
SPF, DKIM, and DMARC are related but different email-authentication mechanisms. Reviewing all three together helps avoid fixing one DNS record while leaving the broader policy unclear.
What SPF does
SPF publishes which mail systems may send for a domain. Receivers can use that policy as one signal when evaluating a message.
The policy needs an accurate sender inventory. A record that omits a legitimate platform can affect valid mail, while a broad policy can reduce the value of the signal.
What DKIM does
DKIM uses a signature added by a sending system and a public key record in DNS. The selector identifies which public record to use for a particular signer.
A DKIM record should be checked for the selector a provider actually uses. A record for a different selector does not prove that the relevant sender is configured correctly.
What DMARC adds
DMARC publishes a policy for messages that fail DMARC checks and brings SPF and DKIM into an alignment-focused framework. Its p=none, p=quarantine, and p=reject policies reflect different enforcement stages.
A DMARC record with p=none is useful for monitoring but is not the same as quarantine or reject enforcement.
- Identify all legitimate sending services.
- Check for one valid SPF policy and review its senders.
- Check the DKIM selector used by each provider.
- Check whether DMARC is present and which policy it publishes.
- Make controlled DNS changes, then recheck the public signals.
Use the right check for the question
CloudSpex Email Security Check provides a public summary of MX, SPF, and DMARC. The dedicated SPF, DKIM, and DMARC tools focus on their specific public signals.
These tools are read-only and intentionally avoid exposing raw DNS records. They help prioritize a review; provider documentation remains the authority for changing a configuration.
One message, three checks
It helps to follow a single message. When a mail server receives it, three different domains may be involved. The envelope sender, also called the return path, is where bounces go and is set by the sending system. The DKIM signing domain is whichever domain's key signed the message. The From address is the one the recipient sees. They can be three different domains, and in mail sent through a third-party service they often are.
SPF checks the envelope sender. DKIM checks the signature. DMARC then asks the question the other two never ask: does either of those results belong to the domain in the From address that the reader actually sees.
Authentication-Results: mx.example.net;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=bounces.example.com;
dkim=pass header.d=example.com header.s=s1;
dmarc=pass (p=reject) header.from=example.comThe three records side by side
Each mechanism is published as a TXT record at a different name. Seeing them together makes it clear that they are separate pieces which do not replace one another.
example.com. TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
s1._domainkey.example.com. TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqh..."
_dmarc.example.com. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com"Alignment, the part people miss
SPF and DKIM were designed before DMARC and neither looks at the visible From address. A message can pass both while claiming to be from a domain that has nothing to do with either result. DMARC closes that gap with alignment: an SPF or DKIM pass only counts if its domain matches the From domain.
In relaxed alignment, the default, the organisational domains must match, so mail.example.com aligns with example.com. In strict alignment the domains must be identical. Only one of the two mechanisms needs to pass with alignment for DMARC to pass.
The practical consequence is that a third-party sender has to be set up to use your domain, not just to send on your behalf. A service that signs with its own domain and uses its own return path will pass SPF and DKIM and fail DMARC.
Why you need both SPF and DKIM
DMARC needs only one aligned pass, so it is tempting to configure one mechanism and stop. The two fail in different situations, which is why both are worth having.
SPF breaks when a message is forwarded, because the forwarding server is not in your record. DKIM survives forwarding, since the signature travels with the message, but breaks when something in between modifies the content, as some mailing lists and security gateways do. With both in place, a message that loses one usually keeps the other.
The order to set things up
The sequence matters because each step produces the information needed for the next.
- List every system that sends mail using the domain.
- Publish one SPF record covering the systems that use your domain as the return path, ending in ~all.
- Turn on DKIM signing with your own domain at every system that supports it, and publish each selector.
- Publish DMARC with p=none and a rua address.
- Read the aggregate reports for a few weeks and fix every legitimate source that fails alignment.
- Move DMARC to quarantine, then to reject.
- Tighten SPF to -all once the reports show no legitimate failures.
Third-party senders
Most alignment problems come from services that send on your behalf. Each one offers some combination of two settings, under different names. A custom DKIM domain, sometimes called domain authentication or sender authentication, makes the service sign with your domain; it usually asks you to publish CNAME or TXT records at selector names. A custom return path, sometimes called a custom bounce domain or MAIL FROM domain, makes SPF align; it usually asks for a CNAME or MX record on a subdomain.
Enable the custom DKIM domain wherever it is offered. It is the more robust of the two and is enough for DMARC by itself. A service that offers neither cannot send aligned mail for your domain, and under an enforcing policy its messages will be quarantined or rejected. The options then are to send from a subdomain with a weaker policy or to change the service.
What authentication does not do
These records prove that a message was authorised by the domain it claims to come from. They do not prove the message is wanted, safe or honest. Spammers authenticate their own domains perfectly well.
They also do not stop lookalike domains. A message from examp1e.com with a valid DMARC record of its own passes every check. And they say nothing about the display name, which many mail clients show more prominently than the address. Authentication protects your exact domain from being forged; protecting people from similar-looking names is a different problem.
What comes after DMARC
Once a domain is at an enforcing DMARC policy, three further standards build on it. MTA-STS lets a domain require that mail sent to it is delivered over verified TLS. TLS-RPT asks sending servers to report when encrypted delivery fails. BIMI lets mailbox providers show a brand logo beside authenticated messages, and requires a DMARC policy of quarantine or reject.
None of them replaces SPF, DKIM or DMARC. They address delivery security and presentation, and each depends on the basics being in place and staying in place.
Common misconceptions
A handful of mistaken beliefs account for most misconfigured domains.
- That SPF protects the From address. It checks the envelope sender, which the reader never sees.
- That a DMARC record of p=none protects the domain. It only produces reports.
- That passing SPF and DKIM means passing DMARC. Without alignment, it does not.
- That adding every service to SPF is harmless. Each include spends part of a ten-lookup budget.
- That authentication is set up once. Senders are added and providers change their records all the time.
Checking a domain
Public DNS shows whether the three records exist and whether they are valid. It does not show alignment, which exists only in real messages. A full check therefore has two parts: read the records, then send a message to a mailbox you control and read its Authentication-Results header. The CloudSpex Email Security Check reads the MX, SPF and DMARC records a receiver would see; the dedicated SPF, DKIM and DMARC tools look at each in detail, and DMARC aggregate reports show what happens to real mail.
A note on subdomains
The three mechanisms treat subdomains differently, which causes confusion. SPF is never inherited: each subdomain needs its own record. DKIM keys are published per selector under whichever domain signs, and a key under the main domain can sign mail from a subdomain. DMARC is inherited: a record on the main domain covers subdomains unless they publish their own, and the sp tag sets a separate policy for them.
Frequently asked questions
Do I need SPF, DKIM, and DMARC?
They serve different roles and are commonly reviewed together. The appropriate configuration depends on your legitimate senders and domain policy.
Can DMARC work without SPF or DKIM?
DMARC relies on authentication and alignment signals, so review SPF and DKIM before treating a DMARC policy as complete.
Does CloudSpex send test email?
No. The public tools read public-facing configuration signals and do not send email or change DNS.
Which should I set up first, SPF, DKIM or DMARC?
SPF and DKIM first, then DMARC at p=none to start receiving reports. DMARC has nothing to evaluate until at least one of the other two is in place.
Is DKIM alone enough for DMARC?
Yes, an aligned DKIM pass is sufficient for DMARC to pass. Keeping SPF as well protects against the cases where a signature is broken in transit.
Why does my newsletter fail DMARC when SPF and DKIM pass?
Because neither result is aligned with your From domain. The platform is signing with its own domain and using its own return path. Enable its custom domain authentication.
Use public checks as a starting point
CloudSpex reads limited public-facing signals. It does not change DNS, website, certificate, or email settings. Confirm the responsible provider and test relevant changes before applying a remediation.
Editorial details
Author and reviewer: CloudSpex. Sources: public technical standards and provider documentation relevant to the topic. Last reviewed: November 10, 2026. We update guides when the product behavior or the underlying guidance changes.