CloudSpex

Domain health guide

How to read DMARC aggregate reports

DMARC aggregate reports are the only place where receivers tell you who is sending mail as your domain. They arrive as XML attachments that nobody wants to read by hand, but the structure is small once you know it.

Use the DMARC Checker

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How you get them

Add a rua tag to your DMARC record with a mailto address. Receivers that support reporting then send one report per day for each reporting organisation, covering the mail they saw from your domain in that period. Reports usually start within a day or two of publishing the record.

If the report address is on a different domain from the one being reported on, that other domain must publish an authorization record, otherwise receivers will not send the reports.

What is inside a report

Each report has three parts. The metadata names the reporting organisation and the date range. The published policy section repeats the DMARC record the receiver saw. The records section is the useful part: one row per combination of sending IP address and authentication result.

  1. source_ip: the address the mail came from.
  2. count: how many messages that row represents.
  3. policy_evaluated: the disposition applied (none, quarantine or reject) and whether DKIM and SPF passed with alignment.
  4. header_from: the domain in the visible From address.
  5. auth_results: the raw DKIM and SPF results, including which domain signed or was checked.

Reading a row

Read policy_evaluated first. A message passes DMARC if either DKIM or SPF passed and was aligned with the From domain. Both failing means the message failed DMARC.

Then use auth_results to see why. A common pattern is DKIM pass in auth_results but DKIM fail in policy_evaluated: the message was signed, but by the provider's domain rather than yours, so it was not aligned. That is a configuration task at the provider, usually enabling a custom signing domain.

Finding every sender

Group rows by source and look at the volume. Sources you recognise and that pass need nothing. Sources you recognise that fail are your work list: each is a legitimate system that would be blocked under an enforcing policy.

Sources you do not recognise are not automatically abuse. Forwarding breaks SPF and often shows up as failing mail from an unrelated mail server, and a forgotten internal system looks exactly like an unknown sender. Treat unknown as unknown until you have checked.

What the reports cannot tell you

Aggregate reports contain no message content, no subject lines and no recipient addresses. They cover only the receivers that send reports, so the totals are a sample, not all of your mail. They are also delayed by a day or more.

Failure reports, requested with the ruf tag, would contain individual messages, but most large receivers no longer send them for privacy reasons.

Using the reports to tighten policy

The decision to move from p=none to quarantine or reject should rest on the reports. When the failing rows that remain are only sources you have decided not to authorise, the policy can be tightened. CloudSpex ingests the reports, groups them by source, and can show how many of the measured messages a stricter policy would have affected, without claiming that the change is safe.

A complete record, annotated

Reports arrive as an XML file, usually compressed, attached to an email whose subject names the reporting organisation and your domain. Inside, the part worth reading is the list of record elements. One record is shown below. Everything in the method that follows refers to these fields.

One record from an aggregate report
<record>
  <row>
    <source_ip>203.0.113.25</source_ip>
    <count>42</count>
    <policy_evaluated>
      <disposition>none</disposition>
      <dkim>fail</dkim>
      <spf>pass</spf>
    </policy_evaluated>
  </row>
  <identifiers>
    <header_from>example.com</header_from>
  </identifiers>
  <auth_results>
    <dkim><domain>mailer.example.net</domain><selector>k1</selector><result>pass</result></dkim>
    <spf><domain>example.com</domain><result>pass</result></spf>
  </auth_results>
</record>

Reading that record

Forty-two messages came from the address 203.0.113.25 claiming to be from example.com. The policy_evaluated block is the DMARC verdict: SPF passed with alignment and DKIM did not. Since one aligned pass is enough, these messages passed DMARC and the disposition is none.

The auth_results block explains the DKIM line. The messages were signed, and the signature verified, but the signing domain was mailer.example.net rather than example.com. The signature is valid and not aligned. This sender currently depends on SPF alone; if any of its mail is forwarded, SPF will fail and nothing will be left to pass DMARC. The action is to enable a custom DKIM domain at that service.

Five patterns you will see

Almost every row in a report falls into one of a small number of patterns, and each has a standard response.

  1. Both pass with alignment: a correctly configured sender. Nothing to do.
  2. SPF aligned, DKIM signed by another domain: works, but fragile. Enable custom DKIM signing at the service.
  3. DKIM aligned, SPF failing or unaligned: fine for DMARC. The service uses its own return path, which is normal.
  4. Both fail, from a source you recognise: a legitimate system that will be blocked under an enforcing policy. Fix it before tightening.
  5. Both fail, from a source you do not recognise, in small numbers: usually forwarding or spoofing. Identify it before deciding.

Identifying an unknown source

A report gives an IP address, not a company name. Three lookups usually identify the sender. The reverse DNS name of the address often names the provider directly. The owner of the address range, from a WHOIS lookup, names the network. And the domains in auth_results show which SPF domain and DKIM signing domain the messages carried, which frequently identifies the service even when the address does not.

If the DKIM domain in the row is that of a large mailbox provider and SPF failed, the message was probably forwarded: someone receives your mail at one address and has it forwarded to another. This is legitimate, and you can do nothing about it except make sure your mail is DKIM-signed so that it survives forwarding.

Two lookups for an unknown address
dig -x 203.0.113.25 +short
whois 203.0.113.25 | grep -i -E 'orgname|netname|descr'

A weekly review

Reports are useful as a trend, not one file at a time. A short weekly review is enough for most domains.

  1. Total the messages per source across all reports for the week.
  2. Sort by volume and look at the largest failing sources first.
  3. Mark each source as yours, known third party, forwarding or unknown.
  4. For every legitimate source that fails, open a task to fix SPF or DKIM alignment at that service.
  5. Note any source that is new this week.
  6. Compare the overall pass rate with last week. A sudden drop usually means a broken record or a rotated key.

Why the totals never match your own figures

The message counts in reports will not equal the number of messages you sent. Only receivers that support reporting send reports, each reports only the mail it received, and smaller providers and corporate mail systems often send none. The reports are a large sample, weighted toward the big mailbox providers.

Counts are also grouped by day in the reporting organisation's own time zone, and reports can arrive a day or two late, so a week of reports does not line up exactly with a calendar week. Use them to compare sources and to watch trends, not as an audit of volume.

Sending reports to another domain

If the rua address is at a different domain from the one being reported on, for example a monitoring service or a central mailbox for several domains, the receiving domain has to publish a record saying it accepts the reports. Without it, reporting organisations are expected to withhold them, and the result is a valid DMARC record that produces no reports at all.

The record is a TXT record on the destination domain, named after the domain being reported on. A wildcard can authorise reports for any domain.

example.net agrees to receive reports about example.com
_dmarc.example.com.                       TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:reports@example.net"
example.com._report._dmarc.example.net.   TXT  "v=DMARC1"

The volume problem

A domain with moderate mail volume receives dozens of reports a day, each a compressed XML file with a different layout quirk. Reading them by hand works for a week. After that the mailbox fills up, nobody opens it, and the domain stays at p=none indefinitely because no one is confident enough to tighten it.

This is the practical reason to send reports to a tool that parses them. The useful output is not the individual report but the aggregate: a list of sources with volume, pass rates and a first-seen date. Use a dedicated mailbox or address for rua in any case, never a person's inbox.

From reports to a decision

The question the reports exist to answer is whether tightening the policy would block legitimate mail. It can be answered directly: take the messages that failed DMARC in the period and ask which sources they came from. If every failing source is either fixed, deliberately unauthorised or forwarding at a level you accept, the policy can move up.

Keep one caveat in view. The reports describe the mail that reporting receivers saw during that period. A sender that runs once a quarter, or mails only recipients at providers that do not report, will not appear. CloudSpex groups the measured messages by source and shows how many a stricter policy would have affected, and it states that this is a count of observed mail, not a guarantee about mail it did not see.

Frequently asked questions

How often are DMARC aggregate reports sent?

Usually once a day per reporting organisation. The ri tag can request a different interval, but most receivers ignore it.

Why does DKIM show pass and fail in the same row?

The auth_results section shows the raw result; policy_evaluated shows the result after alignment. A valid signature from a domain that does not match your From domain passes DKIM but fails DMARC alignment.

Do aggregate reports contain personal data?

They contain sending IP addresses and domains, not message content or recipient addresses.

Why am I not receiving any reports?

Check that the record has a rua tag with a mailto address, that the mailbox accepts mail, and, if the address is on another domain, that the domain publishes the authorization record. A domain that sends very little mail may also simply have nothing to report.

What does disposition mean in a report?

It is what the receiver did with the messages in that row according to DMARC: none, quarantine or reject. It can differ from your published policy because of pct or a local override, in which case the report includes a reason.

Should I request failure reports with ruf?

They are rarely sent now, because they can contain message content. Aggregate reports are sufficient for policy decisions.

Use public checks as a starting point

CloudSpex reads limited public-facing signals. It does not change DNS, website, certificate, or email settings. Confirm the responsible provider and test relevant changes before applying a remediation.

Editorial details

Author and reviewer: CloudSpex. Sources: public technical standards and provider documentation relevant to the topic. Last reviewed: November 10, 2026. We update guides when the product behavior or the underlying guidance changes.